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Abstract—It is well established that neural networks are vul-
nerable to adversarial examples, which are almost imperceptible
on human vision and can cause the deep models misbehave. Such
phenomenon may lead to severely inestimable consequences in
the safety and security critical applications. Existing defenses
are trend to harden the robustness of models against adversarial
attacks, e.g., adversarial training technology. However, these are
usually intractable to implement due to the high cost of re-
training and the cumbersome operations of altering the model
architecture or parameters. In this paper, we discuss the saliency
map method from the view of enhancing model interpretability,
it is similar to introducing the mechanism of the attention to the
model, so as to comprehend the progress of object identification
by the deep networks. We then propose a novel method combined
with additional noises and utilize the inconsistency strategy to
detect adversarial examples. Our experimental results of some
representative adversarial attacks on common datasets including
ImageNet and popular models show that our method can detect
all the attacks with high detection success rate effectively. We
compare it with the existing state-of-the-art technique, and the
experiments indicate that our method is more general.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have been demonstrated to
perform exceptionally well in many fields, such as biomet-
ric identification (Krizhevsky et al. 2012), self-driving cars
(Bojarski er al. 2016), malware detection (Dahl et al. 2013)
and website traffic analysis (Zhang et al. 2019). However,
adversarial attackers can force many DNNs based machine
learning models to misclassify by adding small and imper-
ceptible perturbations on original inputs to generate adversar-
ial examples (Szegedy et al. 2014). Existing representative
adversarial attack technologies usually utilize the key per-
turbation method: gradient based approach. Attackers could
fast generate adversarial examples by using the gradient of
loss function for deep network, then viewing implementing
attack as an optimization problem and construct powerful
adversarial examples with different distortion metric. Recent
studies (Rozsa et al. 2016; Mirjalili et al. 2017; Wei et al.
2020;) show that adversarial examples can be implemented
in physical scenarios, which gives rise to severe safety issues.
Hence detecting or defending against adversarial examples has
emerged as a critical factor in AI.
Almost as soon as the adversarial example attacks appeared,
the researches of adversarial defense had been proposed.
The deep network defense consists of two categories: active
and passive defenses. The former means that a model can
correctly classify adversarially perturbed images by hardening
the network. Among many defense algorithms (Shafahi et
al. 2019; Zhang and Wang 2019),adversarial training is the
one state-of-the-art defense methods, in which the defender
augments each minibatch of training data with adversarial
examples. While the latter could be achieved by detecting
and rejecting adversarial examples instead of modifying the
models. This kind of defense is facilitating for depolying
and applying though it is belong to the passive method. We
also propose the detection defense against adversarial attacks
along with the direction of this research. There are existing
works aiming to implementing detection defenses. Xu et al.
(2018) utilize the prediction inconsistency between the original
and its modified image with special filters to implement
detecting. Ma et al. (2019) propose to use the neural network
invariant checking, i.e. analyzing the provenance channel and
the activation value distribution channel to detect adversarial
samples. Meng et al. (2017) suggests that it can train encoders
and decoders to remove the added noises of the adversarial
examples to further defend against attacks. Recently, a series
of certified adversarial defenses have been proposed (Wong
et al. 2018; Raghunathan et al. 2018; Zhang et al. 2018;
Lecuyer et al. 2018). For example, Zhang et al. (2018) propose
activation function as a certified defense, while Lecuyer et al.
(2018) derive a better certified defense with differential privacy
because a tight robustness guarantee is gained. However,these
techniques are mostly applied to small networks and low-res
datasets.
In this paper, we detect the potential adversarial examples
in the model inputs to achieve the purpose of defense from the
perspective of enhancing interpretability of deep networks. As
we all known, the real subject contour could be observed by
the thermal imager in the night. Inspired by this phenomenon,
whether can we mark the main subject of image recognized
by the deep networks with some technologies, so as to
guide the model to explain its forecast for the object in the
right direction. According to the recent researches for model
interpretability (Simonyan et al. 2013; Springenberg et al.
2014; Zeiler and Fergus 2014; Zhou et al. 2016; Selvaraju
et al. 2020), if the activated regions of main features are
different in the same image, the deep model would produce
inconsistent predictive values for this image. On the other
hand, it is generally necessary for attackers to construct the
combination of specific adversarial noise to make the deep
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models misclassify in many scenarios (Athalye et al. 2018).
Based on the two observations, we propose a novel defense
method, the core of this defense method is considering the
prediction inconsistency of the image by adopting the view
of deep network interpretability. In other words, the model
with the defense method will be able to determine whether the
input contains potential adversarial perturbations by evaluating
the prediction differences between the original input and the
modified version containing activation characteristics.
We apply this novel defense to some classification tasks
based on DNNs and evaluate it both on different attacks
including gradient based attacks and frequently-used datasets
including CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky and Hinton 2009) and Im-
ageNet (Russakovsky et al. 2015). The experimental results
show that we can effectively detect the all attacks considered
on the discussed datasets and models, with generally over 80%
detection accuracy. Besides, we compare our approach with
state-of-the-arts detection approach, feature squeezing (Xu et
al. 2018). The comparative results indicate that our proposed
method can achieve high detection accuracy, and gain the
more better prediction performance for the original inputs. The
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We analyze the interpretability of model based on deep
networks by using the saliency map for the activated region
of image, which can highlight the key region of the image
according to the gradient of the input;
• We propose a novel adversarial defense method to detect
adversarial examples, whose key is utilizing that there is some
inconsistency between the activation regions of the original
input and that of the adversarial version, and there is integrity
between the adversarial perturbations;
• We evaluate the effectiveness of our detection technique
by testing the detection success rate against various attacks.
The evaluation results show that this method can detect the all
represent attacks considered with over 80% accuracy. Compar-
ing with the state-of-the-art detector, its detection success rate
is almost on par with ours, while the proposed method can
keep high prediction accuracy for the benign inputs.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Adversarial Examples and Attack
Recent many researches show that neural networks are
extremely vulnerable to adversarial examples. Essentially, an
adversarial example is the input that is modified by adding the
imperceptible adversarial noises. And the adversarial example
is very similar to one of the original inputs correctly classified,
but the deep models would give different prediction labels for
the two inputs.
Consider a deep neural networks based classifier f with
parameters σ, an input x with ground truth label y and
classification loss function L, while the f could correctly
classify the input, i.e., f(x) = y. The attackers usually seek for
an adversarial example x′ such that the deep model classifies
them differently. This is following the formulation:
Find x′,
s.t.f(x) 6= f(x′),
∆(x, x′) < .
(1)
Where ∆(x, x′)represents the difference between x′and x,  is
the adversarial manipulation budget. Generally, it is so difficult
to solve eq (1) straightway to implement adversarial attacks,
but the problem could be done by solving:
max
δ
L(x′, y, σ), s.t.∆(x, x′) < . (2)
Actually, adversarial examples are initially demonstrated
in (Szegedy et al. 2014; Biggio et al. 2013), have attracted
great attention recently (Goodfellow et al. 2015; Madry et
al. 2018; Tramr et al. 2018; Biggio et al. 2017; Sun et al.
2020). Szegedy et al. (2014) pointed out that neural networks
are vulnerable to adversarial examples and proposed an L-
BFGS based algorithm to generate them. A fast gradient
sign method (FGSM) for the adversarial attack generation is
developed in Goodfellow et al. (2015). Existing deep neural
networks usually adopt some piecewise linear activation func-
tions, which results in that any change of the original input is
propagated to later hidden layers till the output layer for such
deep models. Then, perturbations on inputs can accumulate in
the propagated progress and lead to the misclassification. The
representative FGSM attack is based on the above analysis and
assumes the same attack strength at all dimensions. Formally,
this kind of adversarial example is generated by using the
following equation:
x′ = x+ ε · sign(∇xL(x, y, σ)), (3)
Where ∇ represents the gradient and L(·) is the loss function
used to train the model. Then, Kurakin et al. (2016) proposed
an iterative version of FGSM, Basic Iterative Method (BIM).
Recently, the projection gradient descent (PGD) attacks, a
variant of BIM with uniform random noise as initialization
is conducted
xt+1 = PS(xt + α · sign(∇xL(xt, y, σ))), (4)
where PS(·) is a projection operator projecting the input into
the feasible region S, αT = ε, α is the magnitude of the
perturbation in each iteration and T represents the iterations.
Besides, Carlini and Wagner proposed three different gra-
dient based attacks with different Lp norms(Carlini et al.
2017), namely, L2, L∞ and L0. In the most represent (Car-
lini&Wagner) C&W attack based on L2 norm, there are three
key innovations. Firstly, the adoption of logits Z(·) in the
loss function, which hardens the adversarial attack against
defensive distillation methods; Then, to gain the better trade-
off between the prediction and distance values, they introduce
an optimal constant to control the adversarial example perfor-
mance; Lastly, the key design in this attack is that it maps the
target variable to the argtanh space and the technique could
reduce the dimension of inputs to decrease the computation
cost of generating adversarial examples.
Powerful and representative adversarial attack methods are
critical to better evaluating of defense techniques. The FGSM
attack is one of the methods of fast generating adversarial
examples, and is also the basic of many powerful PGD attacks.
On the other hand, the C&W attack based on L2 norm has be-
come the criterion of evaluating the feasibility of many defense
methods. Consequently, if our proposed defense approach can
effectively detect the two kinds of representative attacks, it is
sufficient for evaluating the validity of this method.
B. Adversarial Defense and Detection
In the meantime, many efforts have been devoted to defend
against adversarial examples (Xie et al. 2018; Guo et al.
2018; Samangouei et al. 2018; Song et al. 2017; Liao et
al. 2018; Liu et al. 2020; Yang et al. 2020; Wang et al.
2020). Existing researches try to implement defense in three
different categories: robust optimization, certified robustness
and detection defense. In the robust optimization, various
adversarial training methods (Goodfellow et al. 2015; Madry et
al. 2018; Tramr et al. 2018; Shafahi et al. 2019) are belong to
the kind of effective defense technologies against adversarial
attacks. It can be traced back to Goodfellow et al. (2015),
in which models are hardened by training on the sets with
the adversarial examples. The robustness of models possessed
by adversarial training relies on the attack strength of the
different adversarial examples. In the certified robustness, a
series of adversarial defenses have been proposed (Wong et
al. 2018; Raghunathan et al. 2018; Zhang et al. 2018; Lecuyer
et al. 2018). They generally seek a certified upper bound of
the adversarial perturbations, the deep neural networks based
model is supposed to be robust if the generating perturbations
are less than this bound. Recently, Cohen et al. (2019) propose
to adopt the randomized smoothing to construct a certified
defense, while a better and tight certified robustness defense
with additional noise is derived in Li et al. (2019).
Among the defense methods against adversarial examples,
the detection based method is also one of the critical branches
of the defense strategy, which is as important as producing
correct output or establishing a certified upper bound. By
use of the detection methods against adversarial attacks, the
owner of model can find the potential adversarial examples and
provide guidance for further denying or adjusting the inputs.
There is one of the most popular detection method against
adversarial examples: prediction inconsistency based algo-
rithm. Tao et al. (2018) proposed to measure the inconsistency
between original neural network and the enhanced network
with some perceptible attributes to detect adversarial examples,
the additional defined attributes are required for detection in
this approach, which is the main limitation of this method due
to the additional huge cost. Then, the state-of-the-art detection
technique, feature squeezing achieves high detection rates for
various attacks. The authors found that there is unnecessarily
large input feature space in the deep neural networks, which
allows an adversary to conveniently implement adversarial
attacks. Thus, they reduced the redundant space by squeezing
the input feature, i.e. reducing the bit depth of input image
and spatial smoothness. They compared the difference between
the prediction value of the original input and the squeezed
sample, if the predicted value difference is greater than the
set threshold, the input is considered to be adversarial. In this
paper, we would compare with the feature squeezing defense
to evaluate the validity of the proposed method based on the
above discuss.
However, according to the work (Xu et al. 2018), the feature
squeezing technique performance is not well on some attacks,
such as FGSM and C&W attacks on ImageNet set, while our
experiments show that our proposed approach executes well
against those attacks. Consequently, this may indicate that our
work is the generalize of feature squeezing in a way.
III. DESIGN
In this section, we first analyze the relation between the
interpretability of deep networks based model and detection
defense against adversarial examples. Then we discuss that
how to implement adversarial detection under the perspective
of interpretability. Lastly, we adopt some image processing
technologies to harden our detection design.
A. Interpretability about Deep Networks
Recently, the models based on deep networks have achieved
unprecedented breakthroughs in different computer vision ap-
plications, such as image classification, semantic segmentation
and object detection. However, these models are extremely
vulnerable to adversarial examples, many scholars suggest that
the lack of model interpretability may be the key reason that it
is hard to defend against adversarial attacks. Hence, we make
some discuss about the interpretability of deep networks for
better implementing our detection.
Existing works (Simonyan et al. 2013; Springenberg et al.
2014; Zeiler and Fergus 2014; Zhou et al. 2016; Selvaraju et
al. 2020) usually regard the model interpretability as the model
visualization problem. To explain the model outputs predicted
by deep networks, they would highlight key pixels, whose
changes in intensities could lead to the most impact on the final
prediction score. Zeiler and Fergus (2014) proposed the classic
Deconvolution method, it connects a deconvolution network
behind the convolutional layer of the model and adopts the
operation of transversal convolution kernel to map features to
pixel space gradually, therefore the learned net of each layer in
deep model is relatively transparent. Essentially, this method
is based on gradient back propagation, which means that
the gradient above zero is propagated forward. So, the main
limitation of Deconvolution is that there are many noises in the
visual image. To solve this problem, Guided backpropagation
(Springenberg et al. 2014) combined the gradient with features
by using ReLU, enabling the better reconstruction of the visual
image with features assembled in the subject. However, despite
producing fine-grained visual images, the two methods are not
class discriminate, that means visual images about different
classes are almost identic.
If we could not discriminate the categories in the model
visualization, the interpretability of deep model is not suf-
ficient for further deploying on other areas, and it is not
convenient to apply to detecting adversarial examples. Zhou et
al. (2016) found that Global Average Pooling (GAP) used by
Network in Network can not only prevent the deep networks
from overfitting, but also generate feature map consistent with
the number of original categories at the last convolutional
layer containing the richest spatial and semantic information.
Then, the Class Activation Mapping (CAM) can be obtained
after weighting each channel in the feature map by using
the gradient of the target category relative to the channel.
A drawback of CAM is that it requires altering the model
architecture and re-training, so it is only applicable to some
particular kinds of deep networks which do not contain any
fully-connected layers.
In order to apply the visualization of deep networks to
our detection defense, we consider utilize Gradient-weighted
Class Activation Mapping (Grad-CAM) method (Selvaraju et
al. 2020). It also obtains the saliency map of the activated
region by calculating the weighted sum of the feature map
corresponding weights. But Grad-CAM uses the global aver-
age of the model gradient back propagation to calculate the
weighted coefficients of the features instead of re-training the
deep model. Broadly speaking, Grad-CAM combines feature
maps using the gradient information that avoids making some
modification in deep networks architecture. And it can be
adopted in various of deep models. Consequently, it is feasible
to apply the Grad-CAM to our detection defense without
altering the target model architecture, and we can utilize this
method to implement detection against different models.
B. Adversarial detection
Abstractly, deep network computation is essentially a pro-
cess of taking a model input and producing the corresponding
classification output. However, the models are usually vulnera-
ble to the adversarial examples due to the uninterpretability of
deep networks to some extent. Consequently, we implement
detection defense against adversarial attacks from the view
of the interpretability. Meanwhile, we destroy the integrity of
adversarial perturbations to harden our defense by utilizing the
additional noises.
Through the above discussion, the CAM can be used to
explain that why the specific image is classified as the dog
but not the cat in a deep model. Now, though the discussion
of interpretability researches of deep network, we know that
it is the saliency map that plays the key role in this progress,
by gaining the saliency map of the discriminative activated
region, the model could produce different results.
Therefore, our overarching idea is to utilize the saliency
map to implement detection during deep model classifica-
tion. The saliency maps are obtained from the Grad-CAM
method, which combines with feature maps using the gradient
information that avoids making some modification in deep
networks architecture. Generally, the attack purpose is that he
can change the prediction of a specific deep model, modifying
the structure of the target model would be pointless and the
cost would be unbearable. Similarly, when someone proposes
a novel defense method against adversarial attacks, the case of
keeping model architecture stable should be considered. Then,
with saliency map contained activated features, we could take
advantage of the prediction difference between the input and
the image produced by the saliency map to judge that whether
the input sample contains potential threats. If the input is
considered as a adversarial example, the prediction will be
refused, otherwise the input is considered a benign sample.
Many works [Szegedy et al. 2014; Biggio et al. 2013;
Goodfellow et al. 2015] suggest that adversarial perturbation
could be accumulated due to the numerous net layers in the
deep networks architecture. And it is feasible for us to obtain
the saliency map of the activated region of the input image
sample without altering the deep networks model by the Grad-
CAM. Hence, for the same input, there is the difference in
the saliency maps of the activated region between the benign
sample and adversarial example in the same trained deep
networks the activation center of the benign must be the main
critical part of the image on the human subjective visual, while
adversarial example activation center could be in other region
of the image.
Activated region. In order to find the desired activated area
of input image in the deep network, we firstly generate the
corresponding saliency map of this input by utilizing the Grad-
CAM. In this strategy, the key weight ack with respect to the
first k feature map fk for the class c is formulated by two
steps:
1. Computing the gradient of the score for class c, yc
gk =
∂yc
∂fki,j
2. Implementing the global average pooling for the gra-
dient
ack =
1
N
∑
i
∑
j
gk
Where the N represents the number of pixels in the feature
map, yc represents the logits output value about the class c
and fki,j refers to the activation at location (i, j) of the feature
map fk.
Then, the critical saliency map Sc could be obtained as
follows:
Sc =
∑
k
ackf
k (5)
Where the weight ack indicates the importance of every f
k for
the output class c. And the Sc is essentially a weighted linear
sum of the presence of the these feature map fk. We gain
the different weights ack by taking the gradient values, so it is
sufficient to highlight the activated region most relevant to the
particular class c.
Finally, in order to obtain the key region used for detection
and avoid the disturbation of irrelevant pixels on the saliency
map, ReLu function could be utilize to select pixels with
positive excitation effect while calculating the saliency map.
This can be expressed as:
W c = ReLU(Sc) = ReLU(
∑
k
ackf
k) (6)
Original image Saliency map
Saliency map of 
adversarial version
Fig. 1. The saliency maps of the original image and its adversarial example.
they are established by the Grad-CAM visualization method, and there are
some differences between the two kinds of saliency maps.
Detection implementation. Now, we have obtained the
saliency map of the input image activated region without
altering the deep model with the (5) and (6). Then, it is
necessary to utilize the saliency map to implement defense
against adversarial examples for the model. It is critical that
how to find the distinctions of the saliency map of the activated
region with respect to the input. An intuitive idea is to adopt
the relation between the input and its saliency map, it is based
on the following observations: Firstly, if the original input
is correctly classified as a special category c, it is sufficient
that the activated region of this image is concentrate upon
the category c by the saliency map; Secondly, adversarial
perturbations are accumulated in the layers of deep networks,
a small perturbation could lead to the difference of saliency
map of adversarial example, The saliency maps of the original
input and its adversarial version can be seen in Figure 1.
Then, in order to ensure that the activated region could play
the role in the model input, we construct the novel image,
named as subject emphasis image, which is generated by
superimposing a certain proportion of the saliency map on the
original input (see Figure 2). This design make it is convenient
for predicting by ensuring consistency of the input format in
deep networks.
Therefore, after implementing the operation of obtaining
the emphasis on the subject, the deep model should be more
Original image Saliency map Emphasizing image 
 
Fig. 2. The construction of the emphasizing image. The saliency map of
the activated region is constructed by using visualization technology, then it
overlaid on the original input with a proportion parameter θ to generate the
emphasizing image.
positive about the previous prediction class c of the original
input, that is, the prediction class of the original input is as
the same as the those of the subject emphasis image. In other
words, if the deep model gives an inconsistent class t to the
subject emphasis image, it is reasonable to judge that the input
may be adversarial. In details, the generating of the saliency
map utilizes the gradient of the input to generate the activated
region according to (Selvaraju et al. 2020), which results in the
activated region of the adversarial example is not stationary.
Thus, the activated region is consistent to the main feature of
the image that if it is benign. When the activated region of the
image is variational, the corresponding classification label is
different from that of the image, it is sufficient to ensure that
this image is adversarial. The detection framework is shown
as Figure 3.
It is notable that there is a hyper-parameter θ in the detection
framework. To some extent, the parameter θ play the key role
in the detection progress. Following the previous process mode
in the deep learning community, we set the value range of θ
is 0.1∼0.3 according to the experimental operations.
C. Enhanced detection
Generally, there is the integrity in adversarial example of
the original input, it could result in the false consistency
of the saliency map that makes the high false nagative rate
of the detection sometimes. In this section, we implement
disturbation to the adversarial examples with the additional
noises, which can disturb the relevance between some pixels
and different regions in the adversarial image. Consequently,
it can highlight the difference of the saliency map to enhance
the detection.
color reversing. Different from grayscale images, there
are RGB three channels in natural images, different colors
can be represented by the combination of different values of
each channel. In practice, it is the contour and the critical
feature (ear, fur or limbs) play the key role in identifying
objects (dog or cat). Even wearing red and blue glasses, we
also can accurately identify the dog or cat. This indicates
that the object color may work for auxiliary judgment in our
identification. Meanwhile, we find that the activated region
of the model on the image is also in the key position of the
object to be predicted in the deep networks model. Hence,
under the premise that the main contour of the object remains
Detector
Input sample
Emphasizing image 
Deep network
Adversarial
Benign 
  
Saliency map
Deep network
Label c
Label  c* 
c c*
c=c*
Fig. 3. The detection defense framework based on the inconsistency prediction. We can gain the key activated region (classification criteria) with the
emphasizing image, and the activated region of the input with adversarial perturbation is generally different from the that of the benign input. Then, by
comparing the output labels that are corresponding to the input and the relative emphasizing images to detect the adversarial examples.
unchanged, the change of the image overall color only leads
to a minimal impact on the activated region. However, it
is the accumulation of small adversarial perturbations that
eventually cheats the model in adversarial attacks. On the
other hand, there are three dimensions in RGB mode for the
convolution kernel of model, and the corresponding value of
each convolution kernel is not the same. So, we can make
the conversion from RGB to BGR in source to disturb the
accumulation of perturbations, which breaks the integrity of
adversarial examples in some degree. That is, it can strengthen
the inconsistency of saliency map without influencing the
activated region to make the detection defense credible.
Zero mean. The brightness value of image is also the
auxiliary factor for identifying an object, in other words, the
change of brightness value of the image will not produce much
impact for identification. Based on this observation, we can
alter brightness value with zero mean method, which keeps the
main contour of the original input, but disturbs the integrity
of adversarial examples. Further, the strategy of zero mean
can reduce the similar parts between the test images and the
whole training set to highlight the key differences, it is also
favorable for detecting adversarial examples. In details, we
subtract the values of the natural image three channels by the
average of all pixel points of the corresponding channels on
the training set. Then, we remove the average brightness value
of the input test samples for implementing efficiently in this
paper. The experimental results show that the zero mean can
improve the detection accuracy.These processed images are
shown in Figure 4.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we discuss the results of some scale evalu-
ation. On the one hand, we implement the proposed detection
defense against the mainstream attack algorithms on different
deep network models to verify the feasibility of the method.
On the other hand, we compare this method with the state-of-
the-art feature squeezing technology, the experimental results
show that the performance of our method is at least on par
with it, and is better than it at other cases, while the proposed
Input sample Color reversing Zero mean
Fig. 4. The image process with additional noise. The operations of color
reversing and zero mean are almost not interferential to identify object for
deep network that is pay more attention to the contour and the key features
of object.
method can ensure the high prediction accuracy for the original
inputs.
A. Setup
Datasets. For mainstream attack algorithms, we perform
our experiments on two popular image datasets: CIFAR-10
and ImageNet . They are colored image datasets used for
image classification. For the ImageNet dataset, we use the
ILSVRC2012 samples, which contains more than 1.2 million
training set image samples and their labels, 50,000 verification
set image samples and 100,000 test set images. However, for
the CIFAR-10 dataset, the image size of this set is only 32∗32,
which results in poor visualization and is difficult to detect in
this defense. Besides, the number of categories in the set does
not meet our expectations, so the results for this dataset are
not presented in this paper. We chose these datasets because
they are the most widely used datasets for classification task
and most representative attacks are carried out on them.
Models. We selected the VGG16 model, ResNet50 model as
the main experimental model, these models are representatives
of their kinds and used in the attacks under study (Goodfellow
et al. 2015; Tramr et al. 2018; Carlini et al. 2017). At the
same time, in order to make a comparison between different
defense, we also evaluated on the relevant model. In model
construction, it is necessary for training ImageNet to require
expensive hardware equipment and vast time, so we choose
the pre-training model Keras on ImageNet. But we still fully
reserve the initialization process of parameters in the original
model, so as to maintain the prediction accuracy of the model.
Attack. We evaluated our detection method on the most
representative attacks described in background section. For the
untargeted gradient based attacks, we considered the FGSM
attack and used the implementations from the ART library
(Nicolae et al. 2019) to generate adversarial examples. On the
other hand, for the targeted gradient based attacks (three C&W
attacks), we adopted implementations from the Carlini et al.
(2017) and focused on the C&W attack based on L2 norm, i.e.,
C&W2 attack. Besides, it is worth noting that we selected the
attack parameters could be optimized in implementing attacks,
so as to make the generated adversarial examples possess high
credibility as far as possible. In the meantime, we reused the
same attack parameters for the Feature Squeezing to make the
better comparison objectively.
B. Detecting attacks with saliency map
This section shows the experimental results about detecting
adversarial examples with saliency map. We adopt the sub-
ject emphasis image, which is generated by superimposing
a certain proportion of the saliency map on the original
input. For the detection direction of adversarial examples,
the detection method should have the following two abilities.
When the input image is the benign, the proposed detection
method cannot significantly affect the predicted value by
deep networks model, especially cannot change the original
prediction category of the image (ImageNet is top-1 accuracy);
While the input image is the adversarial, the detection method
can effectively detect the illegal input, and make early warning
and prevent the input to the deep network model according to
the defense strategy. We conducted experiments on different
deep network models, and the experimental results are shown
in Table 1.
TABLE I
THE DETECTION EFFECTS OF THE MODELS WITH SALIENCY MAP
Proportion (θ) VGG16 ResNet50
OSPA1 FGSM C&W2 OSPA FGSM C&W2
0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
0.1 94.8 18.4 30.4 85.2 22.2 27.2
0.2 84.5 42.0 55.1 70.4 47.3 48.9
0.3 78.2 53.5 63.8 51.7 66.5 64.1
0.4 73.0 61.0 72.5 37.9 74.4 73.9
0.5 69.5 68.4 76.8 23.7 83.3 77.2
1 It represents the Original Samples Prediction Accuracy (OSPA) on the
model, its meaning is the same in the following.
As shown in Table 1, when the saliency map proportion is
0 in the subject emphasis image, it is equivalent to there is no
defense measures, so the detection rate for adversarial exam-
ples is 0%, while the prediction accuracy for the corresponding
original inputs is 100%. Further, with the increase of saliency
map proportion, the detection success rate for adversarial
examples increases gradually, and the prediction accuracy for
benign samples decreases. For the VGG16 model, when the
saliency map proportion paramater θ is equal to 0.5, the de-
tection success rate against FGSM, C&W2 attacks can achieve
68.4%, 76.8% respectively. For the ResNet 50 model, the
corresponding detection success rate against FGSM, C&W2
attacks can reach maximum 83.3%, 77.2%. However, the
prediction accuracy for the original inputs decreases in those
situations, it suggests that the detection defense based on
inconsistency with saliency map sometimes is not enough. We
combine with other proposed methods to improve this situation
and more details will be described in the subsequent sections.
C. Detecting attacks with saliency map & color reversing
As we have analyzed in design section, color reversing of
image does not have a particularly significant impact on human
identification, because we mostly use the contour of the subject
for distinguishing. deep networks also adopt this feature to
some extent, that is, it is not very sensitive to color reversing.
However, the adversarial examples are misclassified through
the accumulation of errors, so the color reversing of the three
channels in RGB images will lead to generate the activation
offset of the adversarial examples at each layer. It breaks
the integrity of adversarial examples, which can strengthen
the inconsistency of saliency map between the original input
and the adversarial example. So, we evaluated saliency map
combined with this method, and the results are shown in Table
2.
TABLE II
THE DETECTION EFFECTS OF THE MODELS WITH SALIENCY MAP & COLOR
REVERSING
Proportion (θ) VGG16 ResNet50
OSPA FGSM C&W2 OSPA FGSM C&W2
0.0 94.8 70.7 53.6 92.1 73.4 54.4
0.1 94.3 69.5 47.8 88.7 75.9 47.8
0.2 91.4 69.5 63.8 80.8 80.3 64.1
0.3 89.1 77.0 68.1 64.0 86.7 69.6
0.4 81.0 78.2 75.4 46.3 91.1 72.8
0.5 78.7 81.0 79.7 27.1 93.1 77.2
It can be found from Table 2 that the saliency map with
color reversing, as we have pointed, effectively detects the
adversarial examples for different attacks, while ensures the
prediction accuracy for the original inputs in deep networks
models. More specifically, for the VGG16 model, when only
the color reversing method is used to detect the adversarial
examples, the detection success rate is more than 70%, and
the prediction accuracy for the original inputs declines by
5.2%. However, this image preprocessing defense of the color
reversing is not robust. If the attacker access to the strategy of
color reversing, the adversarial examples could be generated in
a different color space to evade detection. Thus, it is sufficient
to combine the saliency map with color reversing for robust
detection. Then, as shown in Table 2, when the saliency map
proportion is 50%, the detection success rate against FGSM,
C&W2 attacks can achieve 81.0%, 79.7% respectively for the
VGG16 model. For the ResNet 50 model, the corresponding
detection success rate against FGSM, C&W2 attacks can reach
maximum 93.1%, 77.2%.
D. Detecting attacks with saliency map & zero mean
In this section, we evaluated the detection effect of saliency
map combined with zero mean. As we all known, the bright-
ness value of image is the subordinate factor for identifying
an object. So, the zero mean method for altering brightness
value could not interfere the effort of the saliency map, while
the integrity of adversarial examples could be disturbed. And
the experiments are carried out on the prediction accuracy
for the original images and the detection success rate for
adversarial examples. The experimental results on the different
deep models are shown in Table 3.
TABLE III
THE DETECTION EFFECTS OF THE MODELS WITH SALIENCY MAP & ZERO
MEAN
Proportion (θ) VGG16 ResNet50
OSPA FGSM C&W2 OSPA FGSM C&W2
0.0 93.7 82.8 63.8 92.6 88.2 68.5
0.1 93.7 82.8 69.6 93.6 89.2 72.8
0.2 92.5 82.2 73.9 92.1 89.7 73.9
0.3 86.8 82.2 76.8 85.7 90.2 77.2
0.4 81.0 83.9 76.8 80.8 89.2 78.3
0.5 78.2 85.1 78.3 73.9 90.2 78.3
As shown in Table 3, the saliency map combined with
zero mean method can also effectively detect the adversarial
examples for different attacks, while ensures the prediction ac-
curacy for the original inputs in DNNs models. In other words,
For the VGG16 model, when the saliency map proportion
paramater θ is equal to 0.3, the detection success rate against
FGSM, C&W2 attacks can achieve 82.2%, 76.8% respectively.
And for the ResNet 50 model, the corresponding detection
success rate against FGSM, C&W2attacks can reach maximum
90.2%, 78.3% respectively, while the prediction accuracy for
the original is about more than 73%.
E. Comparison
In order to show the effectiveness of the proposed defense
method intuitively, we compared it with the state-of-the-art
method, named as feature squeezing. The author found that
some unnecessary feature input space brings great convenience
for the attacker to construct adversarial examples, so it re-
duced the redundant space by squeezing the input feature to
implement defending. Besides, we first reproduce the feature
squeezing on the adversarial attack and defense platform ART.
Then, for the median filtering of this method, the ndimage
module in Scipy library was used, and the open CV library
was adopted for the non-local mean filtering. The experimental
results of defending against FGSM attack on VGG16 model
by Feature Squeezing are shown in Table 4
As shown in Table 4, in the image bit depth, the parameter
8-bit represents that no modification has been made to the
input, so the prediction accuracy for the inputs is 100% and
the detection success rate for the adversarial examples is 0%.
When we make the tradeoff between the prediction accuracy
for the original inputs and the detection success rate for the
adversarial examples, the better different squeezing parameters
TABLE IV
THE DETECTION EFFECTS FOR VGG16 BY FEATURE SQUEEZING
methods parameters OSPA FGSM
Image bit depth
1-bit 13.0 8.6
2-bit 55.8 24.1
3-bit 84.2 20.7
4-bit 94.0 2.9
5-bit 97.7 3.5
6-bit 99.5 0.6
Median filtering 2*2 86.1 20.13*3 76.7 21.8
Nonlocal mean filtering
11-3-2 96.3 31.0
11-3-4 90.7 36.8
13-3-2 96.7 32.2
13-3-4 91.2 36.7
Optimal combination 5-bit,2*2,11-3-4 78.6 50.6
are 5-bit, 22 and 11-3-4 respectively in the table. And we
can find that the utilization of the combination of various
squeezing method in Feature Squeezing can achieve better
defense effect (see last line in table 4). Next, we compared the
optimal combination of our proposed defense strategy with the
feature squeezing defense method. Although there is a better
detection success rate in the proposed strategy with saliency
map, we still combine it with color reversing or zero mean.
Not only is the thin point of defense not a good choice, but
also could the latter two technologies break the integrity of
adversarial examples to highlight the inconsistency between
the original and adversarial inputs. In other words, on the
basis of utilizing saliency map, which is inspired by the view
of enhancing the interpretability of deep networks, the defense
point of color reversing or zero mean is added in the proposed
defense strategy to ensure its optimal performance. To make
the evaluation more objective, the experiments are based on
the VGG16 model and the results are shown in Table 5.
TABLE V
THE COMPARISON OF DETECTION EFFECTS BETWEEN OUR METHOD AND
FEATURE SQUEEZING
Optimal defense parameters OSPA FGSM C&W2
Feature Squeezing 5-bit,2*2,11-3-4 78.6 50.6 91.5
saliency map & color reversing θ = 0.1 94.3 69.5 47.8
saliency map & zero mean θ = 0.1 93.7 82.8 69.6
It can be found from the Table 5, when the saliency map
proportion added is equal to 0.1, and the additional color
reversing or zero mean is combined, for the FGSM attack,
the detection success rate of our proposed defense method is
69.5% or 82.8%, which is more than the detection success
rate of feature squeezing method. For the C&W2 attack, the
prediction accuracy for the original inputs of our method
is 93.7% or 94.3%, it is still higher than those of feature
squeezing method, and the detection effect of the proposed
method is also well. According to the work (Xu et al. 2018),
this is possible that there is a limitation of feature squeezing:
requiring high quality squeezers for various attacks. Hence,
our approach is more general compared with it.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a novel prediction inconsistency
based detection algorithm against adversarial examples, which
is based on the view of enhancing model interpretability:
taking advantage of the saliency map of the activated region
to visual the prediction process by the deep networks. We then
construct the defense framework with the saliency map com-
bined with additional noise techniques to implement detection.
Our evaluation results show that our method can accurately
detect current representative attacks, and the performance of
proposed method is at least on par with the state-of-the-art
technique,and is better than it at other cases. However, there
are still a lot to explore along this research theme. Such as,
is there another better interpretability view of deep networks?
How to apply the algorithm to defend against attack in black-
box scenarios? We hope that these questions are addressed
very well in the future work.
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